Inside the Boeing 737 MAX Scandal That Rocked Aviation | WSJ

Inside the Boeing 737 MAX Scandal That Rocked Aviation | WSJ

(dramatic music) – The Boeing saga this past year is an example of how
not to handle a crisis. – A relatively small design issue that exploded into massive catastrophe. – They did not build in
margin for human error. – This brand new plane crashed twice in the span of about five months. How could this possibly happen? – How long has this plane
going to be grounded? Boeing says there’s a fix. When is it coming? – Boeing was once held up
to be the gold standard of engineering excellence. And today it has lost
a lot of credibility. – The 737 MAX scandal will
change aviation history like no other event in the
past five or six decades. – [Narrator] Until relatively recently, Boeing’s reputation among
pilots and passengers was second to none. Today, that faith has
been significantly shaken as America’s aviation
giant continues to reel from the fall out of
two devastating crashes that killed 346 people. The MAX crisis has severely crippled the nation’s biggest exporter. Exposed critical flaws in the relationship between the FAA and the
businesses it regulates. And raised serious questions,
how was this able to happen? Who is to blame, and what does this mean for the future of the aviation industry? (dramatic music) In late 2018, things were
going pretty well for Boeing. – Before the first crash,
Boeing thought of the MAX as a cash cow that
would keep on producing. – They were just breaking
all sorts of records for revenue and airplane deliveries. – [Narrator] A global boom in air travel had helped the company
earn record profits, which drove it’s stock
price to new heights. – Problem prior to the crash for Boeing was that Boeing couldn’t
make the MAX fast enough. We wrote about how Boeing was running out of
parking spots for the MAX. – [Narrator] The MAX
is the latest iteration of Boeing’s 737 aircraft, which first entered
commercial service in 1968. – It’s kind of the work
horse of Boeing’s fleet if you’ve kind of done any
kind of medium length travel, domestically, you’ve almost
definitely flown on a 737. – [Narrator] As times
changed so did the 737. Over the years, Boeing has
updated the jet dozens of times. All the while maintaining
the original air frame. And this system worked well for Boeing. The 737 is the most successful commercial airplane ever made. In 2017, 50 years after
the first 737 took off, Boeing was following a
long established play book when it delivered one of
the first 737 MAX eight’s to a budget Indonesian
airline called Lion Air. – [Newsreader] An
Indonesia passenger plane crashing into the sea
minutes after take off. – [Newsreader] 189 people on board. – [Narrator] On October 29th, 2018, a Boeing 737 MAX eight jet
crashed into the Java sea, killing everyone on board. – There are a bunch of questions
that immediately come up. A brand new plane went
into commercial service about a year before it crashed. That’s unusual. What could have happened? Could there have been pilot error? Was there a maintenance issue? – [Narrator] Some of the
most important reporting to come out after the crash was the story about an
obscure piece of software. – We were obviously trying
to understand things about this airplane and the
systems on the airplane, and so I went to a
aviation safety conference. One of the people we talked to was a pretty senior Boeing executive, and he acknowledged that
they never told pilots about the system. And essentially what’s the big deal. – [Narrator] Boeing at the time argued that pilots didn’t need to know about the existence of the
automated flight control system, who’s name the public would
eventually learn was MCAS. – Well how can that be? How can there be something on a plane, not only that pilots
didn’t fully understand and weren’t trained on, but also just didn’t know that it existed. – After the first crash I think
we still didn’t yet realize how big the story would become. (mellow music) – [Narrator] The origin of the MAX scandal has it’s roots in the rivalry
between Airbus and Boeing. Ever since the 1990’s the two companies have
been locked in competition. By the 2010’s the
commercial aviation market was essentially a stable duopoly, with each company controlling
roughly half of the market. At the heart of this rivalry has long been each company’s flagship commercial passenger plane. For Boeing, that aircraft is the 737, for Airbus, it’s the A320. (dramatic music) In 2010, Airbus shook up the market when it announced the A320 Neo, an updated version of
the A320 aircraft line. Neo planes wouldn’t
just be updated versions of a familiar aircraft, they
would also be cheaper to run. – Fuel efficiency’s the
touchstone of anything that airlines do. I mean, if you talk about bean
counters and penny pinchers, airlines are the ultimate in those areas. – [Narrator] It’s time to think max. – Boeing did not design
a completely new plane from the ground up because
it would have taken too long. – [Narrator] To make the MAX, Boeing took the existing 737 air frame and paired it with a new,
more powerful engine. But doing that changed
the plane’s aerodynamics. One effect was that in
rare flying conditions the aircraft’s nose would pitch up. This is where the MCAS software came in. It was designed to automatically
push the plane’s nose down. – One former Boeing engineer
who didn’t work on the MAX, characterized the software
fix as a band aid. We’ve been learning for the last year how the band aid wasn’t as
strong as Boeing needed it to be. (slow piano music) – [Narrator] On March
10th 2019, a second crash. This time in Ethiopia. All 157 people on board were killed. – [Male] I heard about the second crash. – When on Sunday morning. – I woke up and kind of rolled
over and looked at my phone. – I got a text from an airline official, and it simply read, “MAX eight”. I thought, how could this be, another one? – From the moment that
the second crash happened, we’ve really thought or written
about almost nothing else. – Plane crashes in
general are pretty rare. Plane crash within five
months of each other, is pretty stunning. (dramatic music) – This is unparalleled in
modern commercial aviation. It doesn’t happen. – [Narrator] A day after the crash, in an unprecedented move,
China grounded the MAX. Other nations quickly followed. – China grounding the planes before the FAA had done
that was a huge deal, and it came as a huge
surprise to all of us. – Historically speaking,
the FAA has always been the, the leader that all the
other countries followed. – [Narrator] This was the
first time in aviation history that any nation’s regulatory
body had overruled the FAA. – An emergency order of prohibition to ground all flights
of the 737 MAX eight. – [Narrator] Two days
later, the FAA relented and decided to ground the MAX. This marked the beginning
of the agency’s troubles, as the MAX crisis brought the regulator under increased scrutiny. In April, Boeing began to face
the financial consequences of the scandal. News then emerged that Boeing
hadn’t informed the FAA the warning system that
helped pilots diagnose an MCAS malfunction wasn’t
working as intended. Boeing’s lack of transparency about MCAS was highlighted yet again when a recording emerged of a meeting. – [Michael] If you’re
gonna give us a system that we are gonna be affected by, it’s hugely important that
we get briefed on what it is. – [Narrator] The story was
based partially on a recording made about a month after the first crash, when a group of Boeing executives met with the American
Airlines pilot union. In the tape, the pilots
confront the executives, saying they were not told
enough about the plane. – [Michael] Most people say, “If it ain’t Boeing, it ain’t goin’.” That’s where most of us get that from because we think we’ve
been dealt with honestly by the company. We’re getting told via the news media that you know what, the average pilot, that’s a little bit too much information for him to understand and
be able to comprehend. – [Narrator] Then in July it was revealed that after the first crash, the FAA had done it’s own
internal risk analysis of a potential second crash. – Their analysis showed that if the FAA and Boeing didn’t do anything and just kept the planes
operating as they had been, there would be 15 crashes
over some two decades. That would make the 737 MAX
the most dangerous jet airliner ever developed in the modern world. – What was going on inside Boeing? What was going on inside FAA? Did anyone discuss grounding the plane after the first crash? – A lot of questions have been raised about what the FAA’s role was. Whether the agency was
really doing it’s job in overseeing the design
and production of the MAX. You know, the FAA
delegates Boeing employees to do some of that oversight itself, and I think some people
have questioned whether that has gone too far. You know, whether it’s sort of the fox guarding the hen house. (mellow music) – We set out to pin point the root cause of how Boeing created
a plane that crashes. We really tried to get to the heart of how they came to these decisions. – Why didn’t they use two sensors? They only used one sensor and that is sort of a
violation of basic engineering. – At the root of it Boeing made an incredibly
flawed assumption. – But they failed to recognize badly, that all these other emergency
signals would be confusing. Would make it very very
difficult for a crew to do the right thing
in a fast enough way. – [Narrator] Despite the intense scrutiny surrounding the MAX, at that time Boeing wasn’t
especially forthcoming with information about the plane. – I spent much of the summer
knocking a lot of doors in the Seattle area, trying
to find Boeing and FAA people who would help us understand
how all this happened. People would politely
say no, close the door, sometimes it was more of a
door being slammed in our face. – We went to, I think it was
something like 200 houses, you know, drove 500 miles. It was really difficult to get people to agree to talk with us. – [Narrator] That fall,
Boeing CEO, Dennis Muilenburg appeared before congress, where he was sharply
criticized by senators. – How did you not, in February, set out a nine alarm fire to say, we need to figure out
exactly what happened. – We’re not quite sure
what Mr Faulkner meant by that exchange. – I think it was widely thought that he did not perform
well in those hearings. – He survived two days of
really tough questioning, but he was brutally wounded. – In conjunction with those hearings he sat down with family members
in a closed door meeting, and they sat there with large posters with photos of their loved ones. In one case, a family
member brought photos just of the coffins of his
wife and his mother in law, and his three children, and he lost and he told the Boeing officials, including Dennis Muilenburg, that he didn’t feel they deserved to see his family members’ faces. In December, the company finally said, we can’t keep making these planes, we’re going to have to
shut down our factory. And that has a huge ripple effect throughout the supply chain, and I think, all of the relatively rosy projections that Dennis Muilenburg had been
making throughout the year, finally it came to a head, and the board said enough is enough. – [Narrator] Less than a month
later, Muilenburg was fired. – It wasn’t surprising when
Muilenburg was pushed out, it was more surprising
that it took the board as long as it did to push Muilenburg out. – He wasn’t visible. You know a question that came up a lot was “Where is Dennis?” – [Narrator] In the new year, Boeing has continued to
grapple with the fall out from the MAX scandal. The end of which doesn’t
seem to be anywhere in sight. On January 10th, Boeing released a batch of
internal communications. – They showed Boeing employees talking about tricking regulators and say some really unflattering things about the regulators that
they were dealing with. – It gives you a real glimpse
into culture inside Boeing. – [Narrator] It was
these internal messages that likely led to
Boeing’s hand being forced to reverse their long held stance that pilots didn’t need
simulator training. – That is a stunning development. – We had been writing about
how going back nearly a decade, Boeing had designed the MAX from the start to not require additional
simulator training for pilots. – [Narrator] Flight simulators are highly specialized machines, built to train pilots on the ground. One of the MAX’s biggest selling points, touted by Boeing from the beginning, was that the pilots who
knew earlier 737 models, like the 737 NG, wouldn’t need much more
training to pilot the MAX. For years, Boeing assured
pilots, airlines and regulators that pilots who knew the
NG could easily fly the MAX after just a few hours
of training on an iPad. – Requiring pilots to go
through simulator training before flying the MAX
sort of raises questions about the fundamental, you know, value proposition of the MAX. You know, what is the value of the MAX? – [Narrator] Since March 8th of 2019, Boeing’s market value has
dropped close to $112 billion. – There is an ongoing
criminal investigation by the justice department. There is a civil investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is also the subject of inquiries by the congressional law makers. It is also being looked at by the Department of
Transportation and the FAA. The plane is still on the ground. Perhaps most important
of all, 346 people died. – The MAX saga shows
that there’s something that needs to be reassessed
in that whole system. It’s time to take a breath. And let’s think about the
down sides of automation. How it can confuse pilots, how it can introduce
unexpected consequences and new hazards. So we’re looking at a new world where other regulators
will be much more assertive and will take a much greater
role in approving aircraft, even if they’re US aircraft. – [Narrator] In an email
to the Wall Street Journal, Boeing said, “The development
to the MCAS portion “of the software is complete, “however the entire software package “is going through the
system safety analysis, “and then will be presented
to the FAA for approval.” Boeing said it expects
the MAX to be cleared to back in the air this summer.


  1. Letting Boeing regulate itself is like Dracula the keys to the bloodbank and saying we trust you not to drink it.

    The 737 max crashes were not due to pilot error, the moronic woman who says this at the beginning needs firing.

    Boeing like most american companies is unable to compete with europe on quality or china with cost so all it does is cut costs and not invest in decent products. Looks at american cars only Americans buy them as they are utter rubbish.

  2. Really a rivalry between GE and Pratt & Whitney. The PW1100G engine couldn’t fit on the B737 because Pratt & Whitney could be bothered making the big fuel efficient engine adaptable for the B737 because Boeing never brought from them.

  3. FAA : Hei, that Max system hs problem.
    Boeing : Nope, its NOT A PROBLEM, just a slight software hiccup, will upload latest bug to fix it.. Chill.

    FAA : Hey!!, yr wiring hs problem too. Too many to near.

    Boeing : NOPE,
    we both hs different definition of 'too many n too near'.

  4. 4:43 the graphics are the wrong way round… you’ve labelled an Airbus as a Boeing. This is pretty basic stuff for a report on aviation.

  5. Now with Corona. The built aircraft probably many of them even when it is fixed won’t be delivered because the airlines that were waiting on them will be out of business.

  6. You've got to live with it.. your success and your failure…. Boeing can never be the same again….. the decision makers who decided that safety ain't worth the buck it cost are probably the same one's fixing their own mistakes…. Let them figure it out, it doesn't matter how long or how expensive it is… . Transparency, Truthfullness and no cutting corners…. !!!! ….

  7. 4:44 the diagram shown for each aircraft is incorrect,

    it should be swapped (the left is the A320 and the right is the B737)

  8. MCAS is not a safety feature, it's purely there to make the Max handle like the older generation of the 737 to keep pilot training down so airlines save money. The new engines are bigger and need to be placed higher up for ground clearance since the 737 is a very low aircraft which made it handle differently so MCAS came in to make it handle similarly.

  9. Harvard and Yale MBA’s are not that great, they get caught eventually stealing from the world. Problem is the deep state let’s them run free.

  10. Boeing should re-invest in aircraft and get out of the Space industry altogether. They spread out too far and lost it.

  11. This what happens when companies are allowed to regulate themselves. The Koch's should be proud. This is a consequence of a portion of the US elites efforts to get government out of everything to business can do as it wants. Profit rules!!!!

  12. What a dumpster fire of a story. Good job wsj with the misinformation. If anyone wants to actually know what's going on Juan brown is the guy.

  13. There is such an irony in the Boeing supplied video clips of the first max taking off and going almost vertical. The footage is shown a couple times in this video. That is ironically what the plane does naturally with the engine relocation. The MCAS was to the band-aid to correct this problem. Yet the band aid didn't work well.

  14. The 2nd person in this video , a guy, said the following……" A relatively SMALL design issue that exploded into a massive catastrophe…"……" Is this guy for real? I just wonder how many Boeing shares he is holding ?

  15. Coronavirus(COVID19) is a respiratory disease affecting the world. There are no cases in Kenya. It spreads via a cough or sneeze. Stop*456*9*5#

  16. Boeing should be compelled to surrender their 737 MAX failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), a document required for cars and any safety critical systems.

  17. 737 MAX will never be safe with any software fix! Boeing's solution is just more simulator trainings!

  18. Congress slams ‘fundamentally flawed’ Boeing 737 MAX & ‘grossly insufficient’ FAA in scathing report

  19. They used Bangalore $9/hr to write the code for Starliner. The time on Starliner was Bangalore time.

  20. FAA fines Boeing for unapproved sensors on almost 800 737s

  21. A malfunctioning 737 Max warning light could cost Boeing millions in new FAA fines

  22. FAA faces dilemma over 737 MAX wiring flaw that Boeing missed

  23. FAA tells Boeing that 737 Max wiring bundles are ‘not compliant’

  24. Hundreds of people never to be seen again by their family, friends, partners, children because of greed. It's utterly disgusting

  25. one thing is for sure, im not setting foot on that plane, when im flying. I just dont trust them anymore even if it wil cost my job or vacation.

  26. In the Ethiopian crash a 29 year old captain and a 25 year old first officer with 207 hours in a 737 flew a diving airplane into the ground at 700 mph because they never thought to pull the throttles back from takeoff power. If I’m going to crash, I’ll try to hit at the slowest speed possible..

  27. I blame all of the universities and colleges that pump out these "brilliant" minds, because they're ALL taught essentially the same thing. Money first…Human lives last.

  28. It all started with someone saying they were not allowed to leave in a line of code that self-limited the MCAS input, to prevent exactly the situations that occurred and then was amplified by 2 flight crews failing to properly configure the aircraft, then not following recovery procedures.

    One of the flight crews RECOVERED… then violated the operating manual (leave the electric trim OFF and land) by turning MCAS's control of the trim back on.

  29. I will never fly Boeing max as its shady af however I love other planes by Boeing like 787 but 737max nope

  30. Just imagine how many other corporations this kind of problems this is going on with. I hope Boeing is just the start to show how the corrupt corporations are fooling the public. Even their own employees were talking how bad the jet is.

  31. Business and government oversight agency being in bed together is why we avoid Chinese made aircraft
    It's not suppose to be a life threatening issue from American made aircraft
    Buuuuut….surprise surprise, this giant expensive government isnt doing its job
    And they keep telling people to give up their money and freedom, government will keep u safe

  32. From a former airline pilot……the MAX is inherently safe.

    …….The issue is software, trying to make a new model handle like a prior one, w a different center of gravity.

    The software needs to go, and a new type certificate should be required for pilots ….even for current 737 pilots.

    This is a combination of Boeing employing a high tech solution working with their bean counters, in an attempt to protect market share,

    ….and Boeing bowing to airlines,

    who didn't want to take pilots offline for 6 to 8 weeks of complete classroom and SIM training

    There is a relatively inexpensive and simple fix for Boeing.

    Bite the bullet, and offer each airline customer $25,000 for training per airline pilot, up to 6 pilots per aircraft purchased.

    I've read the preliminary report from Africa
    Rest In Peace…but this was at least a combination of pilot error and tech failure.

    The pilots left the auto-throttles on
    Imagine hitting an ice patch while driving, yet leaving the cruise control on.
    They also re-engaged the auto-trim
    Piloting 101: When technology fails, turn it off, then hand fly.

  33. Boeing willfully disregared a basic engineering principle for the 737 Max. That is: wherever possible, eliminate single-point failures.

    Why did they violate this basic principle?? To make money. Period.

    If the 737 Max was ordered with the optional "Safety Package", the MCAS software was functionally redundant.

    The two planes that crashed did NOT have the optional Safety Package. Cost of the Safety Package option: $80,000.

    I am astonished Boeing would ever consider building a commercial airliner with features that make it safe optional !!! Crazy. And, criminal.

  34. Well with a global industry against the US Administration will not give a hope for sucess. Wait a few more month 😉

  35. @4:35 the A320 and the B737 are not the flagships. They're just the most successful aircrafts of Airbus and Boeing respectively. There's a difference

  36. Re-name it the "737 Max Risk" and have all who fly it sign a waiver indemnifying Boeing just before they board. Problem solved. Cheers!

  37. I'm an airline pilot, and I think this whole thing is very disturbing. Sadly nobody talks about the story of the company and pilots that crashed the first one. This airplane was not repaired properly when it had known issues. The sensor that failed was causing other issues and MCAS wasn't even a factor until the last couple minutes of the flight. Please read the report. That all said, I'm currently in training for the A320. I've spent weeks learning about all the systems and backups for systems that are there to keep pilots from killing themselves. Boeing traditionally leaves pilots with more manual control. In this case, the MCAS was necessary because the plane's flying characteristics were changed. That's not OK for a common type rating. A320s are fly by wire, they can do this stuff via a software change. The 737 is cable operated. You can't software patch cables. So they utilized the one electrically controllable system, the pitch trim. Boeing clearly assumed that pilots would treat this as a pitch trim runaway if it malfunctioned. A commonly required memory procedure on most planes means pilots can intervene before it becomes unflyable. The Lion Air pilots failed to do that. But this is where it stops sounding like I'm defending Boeing. Not only did they not tell any of us about this, they assumed one really bad thing: the reaction would just be a trim runaway. A trim runaway is usually an isolated event. You feel the nose start to rise or fall uncommanded, you have to get on it fast and disable the trim before it overpowers the flight controls. These guys were getting a series of malfunctions related to their bad sensor from liftoff. It was not pandemonium like many would have you believe. But they were preoccupied with the things that were already going on long before the flaps got set to 0 and MCAS actually started operating. This was minutes into the flight. The pilots messed a lot of things up here. But it's very possible that he was so caught up with the issues they already had that he didn't even realize he was fighting a continuous trim situation. This is exacerbated by the fact that in the last minute of the flight he handed the plane to the FO without telling him anything about that issue and he almost immediately lost control. The angle of attack sensor is a critical piece of equipment on any plane. When one fails, it can cause very very severe consequences if not handled properly, even on an Airbus. To give mechanical control of the airplane to a system with zero redundancy and no pilot training is unheard of. Until now I guess. Now, with the virus, Boeing may very well be sunk.

  38. 14:25 "Regulators will take a greater role in approving aircraft even if it's US aircraft "
    Finally someone said it… even if it's made domestic, it doesn't prove it's good.
    And from what I've seen from those videos Boeing had too much self approving power.

  39. Airlines are entitled to cancel 737 Max orders unless Boeing can provide a cast iron guarantee on the return of the aircraft in 2021, and that Boeing has fully paid out for perpetual insurance against ANY PROBLEMS with the aircraft. That will cost more than the discounts. It is illegal for the US Government to provide ANY FINACIAL ASSISTANCE following the WTO ruling. This includes having to disclose the payments made by DoD for all military contracts.

  40. The Bloomberg video that just came out actually goes into how the MCAS engineering mistake came about. Hint, it wasn't an engineering mistake.

  41. the key problem is the drive for increasing profits and returns pushed for by the shareholders. they are only interested in short term returns. irrespective of sound longterm business needs. this means there needs to be a chnage of attitude with the shareholders.

  42. Interesting that this plane flew for two years in the US without any issues… Simulator training has always been encouraged to understand new features, which is exactly why these crashes happened at budget airlines in countries where Boeing and the FAA can’t regulate training and maintenance.

  43. There is a glaring hole in all of this that no one likes to talk about. Passengers demand cheaper and cheaper tickets which in turns means airlines are hiring lower and lower time pilots. A 737 may look new, but the guts of it are still based in the 1960s which requires pilots with good stick and rudder skills to fly safely. You cannot take a low time pilot and put them in a 737 and not expect a hull loss. In the Ethiopian crash, they had the engines at climb thrust right until impact, massively overspeeding the airframe and making trim control impossible. Airlines push crews through simulator training, giving them scripts on what exactly to expect on the evaluation with the concern merely to check the regulator compliance box, not to ensure that they can fly the aircraft safely.

  44. The fact that companies can get away with making the simple calculations on the values of lives in dollars remains sickening and that is exactly what happened here. The only minor issue for them is this time the math didn't work out, so it will cost a lot of money and that be the end of it. People should be held accountable, if you are in charge you are and should be held fully accountable from top to the bottom anyone who agrees with something like this should face the consequences of their actions in a criminal investigation and charges.

  45. It used to be that if an aircraft was good enough for the yanks at the FAA it was assumed to be good enough for the world. What Boeing has done with the max has persuaded the world that if its American certified its probably rubbish as the yanks have no idea how to certify an aircraft properly so new American aircraft will probably have to get recertified elsewhere to be allowed to fly elsewhere!

  46. This report fails to mention the key starting point : the new engines did not fit on the old body design.
    So the report itself mimics how mistakes are made, by making one too.

  47. consequences of 'small government/deregulations'

    there's a big difference between 'no end in sight' and 'this summer'

  48. 737's suffered another design flaw with rudder hard overs that took down 2 planes and almost another.

  49. THE first item is: the software was let to be designed by England, which I consider so stupid as to suspect there was BIG a bribe. After all En gland builds the German 320s, etc. possibly too maybe the $$$$ came from China. I know they are AIMING at Boeing all the time!!!! Of course, Muilenburg is weak.TU

  50. Across the USA in a 737 is six hours of discomfort. The bathrooms are in the rear, more than 20 rows. The aisle is clogged with two carts. The seat support posts do not align with the seats. It was a relief to fly on the A321 — bathroom in the middle of the aircraft. The seat posts in line with seats.

    Boeing board members and executives should be forced to travel on the 737 Max (cattle class only) and never on anything else for five years. Each flight should be full for them to endure the trips to bathroom in the rear. Only then should the 737 Max be open for the general public.

  51. The Irony of it all is that for the last two decades Boeing mocked Airbus for being a computer flown airplanes with little pilot authority… And then this happened…

  52. The problem with the plane, not stated in the video, is that the engine chosen cannot be easily fit under the wings, and they didn't want to fund a "clean sheet" aircraft design.
    Positioning the powerplant forward of the wing leads to the nose of the plane rising when engine power is applied.
    Flight computer software was added to counteract the tendency of the plane's nose to lift by pitching down the nose.
    Pilots weren't informed of this tendency, and were not physically strong enough to fight the controls and save the humanity aboard.

  53. The boeing saga last year showed how not to handle a crisis…
    Beoing ex CEO disagrees, he made $62,000,000 handling it that way. Maybe shareholders should take some lessons in capitalism; if you reward incompetence, incompetence will rapidly overtake competence.

  54. One thing they forgot to mention
    The MAX came out hurriedly after American placed an order for more NGs, and a “new, fuel efficient 737”. At the time, only the NEO program existed, and so in order to compete, and not lose its order from American, Boeing cape up with the MAX “design”. Not saying this is the fault of American, but definitely played a factor in all of this

  55. I hope the covid19 does what no politician or government worker is willing to do, send all 737 max to a landfill

  56. One other thing that changed is that China and then Europe were early in grounding it. It may happen that before the 737 Max can fly again those regulators will want to approve the plane first on their own.

  57. Could you even think of a reason for airlines to buy new planes under COVID-19???? Also, could you also think of a reason for the public to trust boeing and actually buy the ticket for the trip that is operated by a max???

  58. As a former commercial pilot, one of the primary rules for a pilot is to fly the plane. These inept "pilots" let the plane fly itself and when they didn't understand what it was doing, they panicked and did the exact opposite of what their training taught them to do.

  59. how the heck are the boeing big wigs supposed to attend to all these "minor" details when they are all busy counting their cash–43 billion in share buybacks! criminal mismanagement.

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